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I. INTRODUCTION
Constitutional skepticism arises whenever governmental policies
provide benefits to certain members of society based on race or ethnic-
ity. I "Except in the narrowest of circumstances, the Constitution bars
such racial classifications as a denial to particular individuals, of any
race or ethnicity, of 'the equal protection of the laws.' "2 Therefore,
"[a]ny preference based on racial or ethnic criteria must necessarily
receive a most searching examination to make sure that it does not
conflict with constitutional guarantees."3
Due to the significant possibility of Equal Protection violations,
the judicial system has developed heightened standards of review for
determining the legitimacy of programs which consider race as a fac-
1. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978) ("Racial and ethnic
distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect."); BERNARD SCHWARTZ, BEHIND BAKKE
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND THE SUPREME COURT 67 (1988). Former Chief Justice Warren
Burger said: "No member of this Court, so far as I recall, has ever had any question but that
racial classifications are suspect under all circumstances." Memorandum to the Conference at
2, Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, reprinted in SCHWARTZ, supra, at 168.
2. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3029 (1990) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1).
3. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 491 (1980).
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tor.4 Before a court can examine the details of a race-based policy, it
must ascertain which of the available standards is appropriate for the
specific program. Certain members of the judiciary particularly
emphasize this preliminary stage of the constitutional analysis. As
Justice O'Connor notes:
This dispute regarding the appropriate standard of review may
strike some as a lawyers' quibble over words, but it is not. The
standard of review establishes whether and when the Court and
Constitution allow the Government to employ racial classifica-
tions. A lower standard signals that the Government may resort to
racial distinctions more readily.'
Whether, as Justice O'Connor asserts, the standard of review is truly
determinative of the constitutionality of government race-based poli-
cies will be the ultimate focus of this Comment.
Throughout the relatively recent history of governmental affirm-
ative action adjudication,6 members of the Supreme Court have fre-
quently disagreed on the appropriate standard of review for such
cases.7 However, in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson,8 the Court
appeared to put to rest the certainty surrounding the appropriate
standard of review for cases involving public affirmative action pro-
grams. Croson marked the first time a majority of the court agreed on
4. The origin of more exacting standards of review for race-based measures is footnote
four to Justice Stone's opinion in United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144 (1938). See
SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 73. One of Justice Stone's former law clerks termed the note
"The Famous Footnote Four." Alpheus Thomas Mason, The Core of Free Government, 1938-
1940." Mr. Justice Stone and "Preferred Freedoms," 65 YALE L.J. 597, 598 (1956). In that
note, Justice Stone stated that legislation which considers race as a special condition "may call
for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry." Carolene, 304 U.S. at 152 n.4. In
explaining the note to Chief Justice Hughes, Justice Stone stated:
"It seemed to me desirable to file a caveat in the note" to the rational-basis
standard applied in "the ordinary run of ... cases" for "these other more
exceptional cases .... [T]he court should be more alert to protect constitutional
rights in those cases where there is a danger that the ordinary political processes
for the correction of undesirable legislation may not operate."
SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 74 (quoting ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE:
PILLAR OF THE LAW 514 (1956)).
5. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3033 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
6. This comment will explore only the line of cases involving government-sponsored
affirmative action programs. It will not, for instance, address the legitimacy under Title VII of
affirmative action policies initiated by private employers.
7. The Bakke opinions articulated two disparate standards. The opinion of Justice
Powell advocated one standard; Justice Brennan's opinion advocated another. Two years
later, in Fullilove, various members of the court again proposed the use of the same two
standards. Chief Justice Burger, writing a plurality opinion, did not advocate a specific
standard, but rather implemented his own test. See infra p. 1313. Later in Wygant v. Jackson
Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267 (1986), the court again split on the standard of review
question.
8. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
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a standard in a government affirmative action case. 9 The Court
explicitly stated in Justice O'Connor's majority opinion that, unless
Congress enacted a particular policy under its "unique remedial pow-
ers ... under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment," 10 the Court
should apply the strict scrutiny test.I However, Croson proved not to
be as definitive on the issue as it may have initially seemed.
One year later, in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,12 the Court
stated that "Croson ... does not prescribe the level of scrutiny to be
applied to a benign racial classification employed by Congress."13 In
upholding certain minority preference policies of the FCC, the Court
instead chose to employ a less exacting standard. Rather than requir-
ing that race-based programs be "necessary and narrowly tailored to
achieve a compelling interest,"14 the Court, in an opinion written by
Justice Brennan, merely inquired whether the FCC policies were
"substantially related to the achievement" of "important governmen-
tal objectives within the power of Congress."' 5 Justice Brennan had
previously advocated this intermediate scrutiny standard of review in
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 16 in an opinion which
Justices Marshal, Blackmun, and White17 joined. Since Bakke, how-
ever, only Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun had endorsed
the use of intermediate scrutiny for reviewing government sponsored
affirmative action programs."8 Indeed, no majority of the Court had
ever endorsed the use of relaxed scrutiny for cases involving legisla-
tive racial preferences.19 The question thus becomes: why did the
Court choose Metro Broadcasting to diverge from its recent course?20
9. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (O'Connor, J., joined in relevant part by Rehnquist, C.J.,
White and Kennedy, J.J.); id. at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring).
10. Croson, 488 U.S. at 488.
11. Id. at 493.
12. 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990).
13. Id. at 3009.
14. Id. at 3029 ("Strict scrutiny" is defined as "necessary and narrowly tailored to achieve
a compelling interest".).
15. Id. at 3008 ("Intermediate scrutiny" is defined as "substantially related to the
achievement of important governmental objectives within the power of Congress".).
16. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
17. It is not entirely clear whether Justice White fully endorsed this standard of review in
Bakke. While joining Justice Brennan's opinion (along with Justices Marshall and Blackmun),
Justice White was the only Justice to also join part III-A of Justice Powell's opinion which
expressly endorsed the use of strict scrutiny. See infra p. 1316.
18. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476
U.S. 267 (1986); Croson, 488 U.S. at 469.
19. Charles Fried, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Two Concepts of Equality, 104 HARV.
L. REV. 107, 112 (1990).
20. The significance of Metro Broadcasting extends beyond the Court's use of a relaxed
standard of review: The Court acknowledged the Government's legitimate interests in curing
the effects of past discrimination, and found that the FCC's stated goal of achieving broadcast
1992] 1307
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The most plausible explanation lies in Justice Brennan's strategic
ability to build a coalition on the bench in order to realize a desired
result.21 In Metro Broadcasting, Justice Brennan's last major victory
on the Supreme Court, he was able to forge a majority which predict-
ably included Justices Marshall and Blackmun, as well as Justice Ste-
vens, who had previously split with the conservatives in Wygant v.
Jackson Board of Education.22 Moreover, Justice White also voted
with the majority to employ intermediate scrutiny, in seeming contra-
diction of his position in Croson.
Part I of this Comment will explore the possible rationale behind
Justice White's decision to join the majority in its adoption of inter-
mediate scrutiny. This section will focus on White's past voting rec-
ord in this area.23 This Comment suggests that Justice Brennan was
able to garner Justice White's support for a relaxed standard of review
by making the use of intermediate scrutiny in Metro Broadcasting
appear consistent with positions Justice White had previously taken.
Part II will explore the flaws in this reasoning, and the judicial incon-
sistencies resulting from Justice White's decision to employ intermedi-
ate scrutiny in this case.24 Part III will show that the particular
standard of review may not necessarily determine the outcome of
affirmative action cases before the Supreme Court. Instead, at least
for Justice White, the ultimate determination hinges on the goals of
the particular governmental program, and on who is trying to achieve
them. The specific standard of review thus becomes a mere proce-
dural means to accomplish a desired end.
II. CONSTRUCTION OF THE METRO BROADCASTING MAJORITY
OPINION BASED ON JUSTICE WHITE'S AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION VOTING RECORD
The Court's use of strict scrutiny in Croson seemed to firmly
establish a uniform standard of review for both state and federal
diversity was, in itself, valid. Although vital to the future of affirmative action adjudication,
the question of whether diversity constitutes a "compelling" interest under strict scrutiny, or
an "important" interest under intermediate scrutiny, is beyond the scope of this Comment.
21. See Neal E. Devins, Metro Broadcasting v. FCC- Requiem for a Heavyweight, 69 TEX.
L. REV. 125, 128 (1990).
22. 476 U.S. 267 (1986)
23. To ascertain Justice White's position on the issue, it is necessary to examine his voting
record, because he has authored few opinions in this area. Justice White did write concurring
opinions in Bakke and Wygant, but he never expressly adopted a standard of review.
24. This section is premised on the theory advocated by Justice O'Connor, that members
of the Court should be consistent in their adoption of a particular level of scrutiny, and that
they should not allow the level to vary based on the circumstances of the case before the Court.
See infra p. 1315.
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affirmative action programs." However, the result in Metro Broad-
casting, where the majority relied on intermediate scrutiny as the
standard of review, proved such conclusions to be premature.
Metro Broadcasting became the most unexpected success of the
1989 term for Justice Brennan. 26 But in retrospect, and given the
nature of the opinion, the outcome is not quite as surprising as it first
appeared. Brennan devised the opinion with the specific intention of
holding the pivotal fifth vote, that of Justice White." White had
joined without comment Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion in
Croson, which employed strict scrutiny as the standard of review, and
he seemed unlikely to deviate from that position in Metro Broadcast-
ing. But to ensure a majority, Justice Brennan needed the crucial
swing vote of Justice White.28 Brennan appears to have intentionally
fashioned the Metro Broadcasting opinion to win Justice White's sup-
port. To that end, he drew on three particular cases, Bakke, Fullilove
and Croson, which focus on issues particularly important to White.29
In Metro Broadcasting, the Court considered the constitutional-
ity of two minority preference policies of the Federal Communica-
tions Commission.3 0 The policies were challenged under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 3  The first policy awards
an enhancement for minority32 ownership33 in comparative proceed-
ings grants of new broadcast licenses.3 4 The second policy, called the
"distress sale" program, permits a broadcaster, in certain circum-
25. Devins, supra note 21, at 146 n.141.
26. Ruth Marcus, Supreme Court Liberals Savor Wins Amid Conservative Majority, WASH.
POST, July 2, 1990, at A5.
27. Fried, supra note 19, at 126. See also Devins, supra note 21, at 128 n.21 (attributing
critical features of the Court's analysis to "Justice Brennan's efforts to have Justice White
provide the critical fifth vote.").
28. See James Scanlan, Affirmative Action: The Court's Surprise?, TEX. LAW., July 20,
1990 at S-14 ("White's unanticipated vote to uphold--coming a decade after he had last
supported an affirmative action program-proved decisive.").
29. See Marcia Coyle, A Final Victory Marks End of a Career, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 13, 1990,
at S4 (observing that Metro Broadcasting reflects Brennan's "consummate skill and brilliance
in fine-tuning decisions in such a way that the essential fifth vote either signed on to or wrote
the majority opinion.").
30. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct., at 2999, 3002.
31. Id.
32. Id. n. 1. ("The FCC has defined the term 'minority' to include 'those of Black, Hispanic
Surnamed, American Eskimo, Aleut, American Indian and Asiatic American extraction.'"
(quoting Statement of Policy on Minority Ownership of Broadcasting Facilities, 68 F.C.C.2d
979, 980 n.8 (1978))).
33. The minority ownership preference is given to applicants "a majority of whose
ownership interests are held by a member or members of a minority group." H.R. CONF. REP.
No. 765, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 44 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2261, 2288.
34. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3002.
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stances, to transfer his license only to minority controlled firms.3
The Court found that neither of the policies violated Equal Protection
principles.
"The real surprise of Metro Broadcasting, however, is not its out-
come,"36 but rather the means by which it came about. Justice Bren-
nan's analysis first discussed the standard of review the Court applied
to determine the legitimacy of the FCC policies. Pointing to the
Court's decision in Fullilove, Brennan noted that three of the Court's
members would have upheld benign racial classifications that "serve
important governmental objectives and are substantially related to
achievement of those objectives. ' 37 This is the classic language of
intermediate scrutiny.38 Justice White, however, was not one of the
three who used this standard in Fullilove. Therefore, the argument
that certain members of the court had previously employed intermedi-
ate scrutiny would not have been enough to convince Justice White to
agree on the use of intermediate scrutiny in Metro Broadcasting. But
based on White's past voting record and despite Justice White's recent
allegiance with the conservatives in this area,39 Justice Brennan had
ample evidence that it would not be impossible to convince Justice
White to adopt intermediate scrutiny in Metro Broadcasting. 4
A. Bakke
Justice White had supported a standard of intermediate scrutiny
when Justice Brennan initially applied it to an affirmative action plan
in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.4' Bakke was the
first case in which the Supreme Court directly confronted the reverse
discrimination issue. 42 In Bakke, the plaintiff was a white male appli-
cant who had been denied admission to the medical school of the Uni-
35. Id.
36. Devins, supra note 21, at 126.
37. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3008 (quoting Fullilove, 448 U.S. 448, 519)
(Marshall, J., concurring).
38. Richard C. Reuben, Affirmative Action OK'd by Justices, L.A. Daily J., June 28, 1990,
at 8, col. 2 (quoting Erwin Chemerinsky, a constitutional law scholar at the University of
Southern California Law Center in Los Angeles).
39. "Nothing in White's recent actions suggested he would join the liberals in an
affirmative action decision." Scanlan, supra note 27, at S-14.
40. Cf Scanlan, supra note 27, at S-14 ("[I]f there was little reason to expect to find White
voting to uphold the FCC preferences, there is nothing in his prior opinions that necessarily
makes Metro a radical departure. Although his recent opinions reflect an aversion to race
conscious measures, that aversion was not declared as absolute.").
41. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
42. David B. Stoelting, Note, Minority Business Set-Asides Must Be Supported By Specific
Evidence of Prior Discrimination: City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989),
58 U. CIN. L. REV. 1097, 1101 (1990).
1310
JUSTICE WHITE
versity of California at Davis.43 He claimed that the admissions
policy violated the Equal Protection Clause, because the school had
implemented an affirmative action program which reserved sixteen of
the one hundred places in each entering class for disadvantaged mem-
bers of minority groups." By a five-to-four plurality vote, the Court
held that this specific program violated the Equal Protection Clause. 5
Nevertheless, a majority of the Justices concluded that race might,
under certain circumstances, be a proper admissions criterion.46
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and
White, borrowed from the language of the gender discrimination
cases47 and stated that racial classifications designed to further reme-
dial purposes "must serve important governmental objectives and
must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives."4 8
Justice White's endorsement of intermediate scrutiny for reviewing a
government-funded affirmative action programs in Bakke was to pro-
vide a foundation for his support of intermediate scrutiny in Metro
Broadcasting, more than a decade later.
Bakke is a significant precursor of the Metro Broadcasting deci-
sion for another reason. Applying the intermediate scrutiny test, the
Metro Broadcasting majority found that the interest in enhancing
broadcast diversity is, at the very least, an important governmental
objective.49 The Court stated that "just as a 'diverse student body'
contributing to a 'robust exchange of ideas' is a 'constitutionally per-
missible goal' on which a race-conscious university admissions pro-
gram may be predicated, the diversity of views and information of the
airwaves serves important First Amendment values."50 Although the
question whether diversity is a legitimate goal under either strict or
intermediate scrutiny is beyond the scope of this Comment,5 1 Bakke
at least offers some explanation why diversity was accepted as a legiti-
mate goal in Metro Broadcasting.52
43. 438 U.S. at 276, 277.
44. Id. at 275.
45. Id. at 305-15.
46. Id. at 320 (Powell, J.) ("IT]he State has a substantial interest that legitimately may be
served by a properly devised admissions program involving the competitive consideration of
race and ethnic origin."); id. at 326 (opinion of Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.).
47. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), and its progeny.
48. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 359 (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.) (quoting
Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 317 (1977); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976)).
49. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3010.
50. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3010 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-13 (opinion of
Powell, J.)).
51. See supra note 20.
52. The significance of diversity as an objective in the adjudication of these cases is
discussed in detail in infra part III.
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B. Fullilove
While Bakke may have been one basic reason for Justice White
to side with the majority and to apply intermediate scrutiny in Metro
Broadcasting, Justice Brennan's extensive reliance on the rationale of
Fullilove throughout his Metro Broadcasting opinion probably most
profoundly influenced Justice White. Fullilove involved a constitu-
tional challenge to a congressionally created provision of the Public
Works Employment Act of 1977." The affirmative action program
required that, in the absence of an administrative waiver, ten percent
of the federal funds granted for local projects be allocated to busi-
nesses owned by members of specified minority groups.5" By a six-to-
three vote, the Court upheld the measure, concluding that it did not
violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution."
According to "the most important scholarly analysis of Fulli-
love,"'56 that case clearly focused on the constitutionality of a congres-
sionally mandated program.5 7 The majority adopted the same focus
in Metro Broadcasting, stating that "the FCC's minority ownership
policies have been specifically approved-indeed, mandated-by Con-
gress."58 Justice Brennan embraced Chief Justice Burger's position in
Fullilove, stressing the necessity of giving deference to Congress as a
co-equal branch of the government.59 Because of that necessity, Bren-
nan concluded, the Court should employ a lesser standard when
reviewing federal affirmative action legislation.' The significance of
Brennan's apparent concern over giving deference to Congress,
because Congress had "mandated" the FCC's racial policies, cannot
be emphasized enough in the analysis of Justice White's position in
53. 448 U.S. at 455-56.
54. Id. at 454.
55. Id. at 492 (opinion of Burger, C.J. and White and Powell, JJ.); id. at 522 (opinion of
Marshall, Brennan and Blackmun, JJ.).
56. Earl M. Maltz, Affirmative Action and Employer Autonomy: A Comment on City of
Richmond v. .A. Croson Co., 68 OR. L. REV. 459, 464 n.44 (1989).
57. Drew S. Days, Fullilove, 96 YALE L.J. 453, 474 (1987); see also Stoelling, supra note
42, at 1118 n.163.
58. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3008.
59. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 472 (1980). "Although Fullilove had addressed
congressional enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment through a remedial set-aside, the
Metro Broadcasting Court interpreted the case as suggesting more generally that the courts
should defer to Congress's employment of race preferences because of Congress's 'institutional
competence as the national legislature.'" Devins, supra note 21, at 133 (quoting Metro
Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3008.).
60. Although the affirmative action program in Metro Broadcasting was not enacted by
Congress itself, the majority reasoned that Congress had nevertheless mandated it. In
particular the Court attached significance to an appropriations rider for the fiscal year 1988,
effectively prohibiting the FCC from reviewing any of its policies relating to minority
preferences. Id. at 3016.
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Metro Broadcasting.6 In Fullilove, only Chief Justice Burger and Jus-
tice White found the fact that the measure emanated from Congress
dispositive.6 2 Moreover, Justice White's personal preference for yield-
ing to Congress is well known.6 3 There is little question that this pref-
erence provided a strong impetus for Justice White to join Justice
Brennan in adopting a less exacting standard of review.'
Justice Brennan also relied on a second facet of Burger's Fullilove
opinion to sway Justice White. In his Fullilove opinion, which Justice
White had joined, Chief Justice Burger expressly declined to adopt
strict scrutiny in his analysis of the Congressional program in ques-
tion.65 Because Fullilove did not formally endorse any standard of
review, Brennan concluded that precedent did not constrain the
Metro Broadcasting Court's choice of a standard of review.66 Simi-
larly, because Justice White had never applied strict scrutiny when
reviewing a federal measure in the past, his record did not require him
to apply it in Metro Broadcasting. Viewed in this light, Justice
White's endorsement of intermediate scrutiny in Metro Broadcasting
does not appear to be inconsistent with his established credo.
C. Croson
After determining that Fullilove did not prescribe the appropriate
standard of review for Metro Broadcasting, Justice Brennan had to
61. See Bruce Fein et al., The Brennan Legacy: A Roundtable Discussion, A.B.A. J., Feb.
1991, at 53. According to Jesse Choper, Dean of Boalt Hall School of Law, University of
California at Berkeley, the portion of Brennan's analysis stressing that Congress mandated the
FCC policies "was put in there for Justice White." Moreover, "it didn't make the least bit of
difference to Justice Brennan whether it was enacted by Congress or not-he would have
approved it in any event." Id.
62. See Days, supra note 57, at 474.
63. Devins, supra note 21, at 125 n.6; see also David 0. Stewart, White to the Right?,
A.B.A. J., July 1990, at 42 (Justice White has a tendency to vote with the federal government
says one of his former law clerks. Another former clerk agreed that with White "one of the
constants is respect for federal power or federal authority. You can usually fill him in on the
side of the federal government.").
64. See Neil A. Lewis, Court Ruling Encourages Affirmative Action, N.Y. Times, July 4,
1990, at 12 (According to former Solicitor General Charles Fried, Professor of Law at
Harvard University, White provided the critical fifth vote because he is highly respectful of
Congress. Fried found that "Congress looms very large in White's jurisprudence." Fried's
colleague, Professor Kathleen Sullivan of Harvard Law School, offered a similar analysis,
stating that White joined the majority because of his deference to other branches of
government.) Note, again, that it is questionable whether Congress ever "mandated" the FCC
policies. See infra notes 110-112 and accompanying text. Rather, Congress seemed to "allow"
the FCC policies. See supra note 60.
65. 448 U.S. at 492 ("This opinion does not adopt, either expressly or implicitly, the
formulas of analysis articulated in such cases as University of California Regents v. Bakke," of
which strict scrutiny was one.) (opinion of Burger, C.J.).
66. Devins, supra note 21, at 133.
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distinguish City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. 67 Croson was the first
case in which a majority of the Court used strict scrutiny to review a
government sponsored affirmative action program. In Croson, the
Court examined the constitutionality of an affirmative action program
implemented by the City of Richmond. In a six-to-three decision, the
Court found the Minority Business Utilization Plan unconstitutional
because it required prime contractors holding city construction con-
tracts to sub-contract at least thirty percent of the dollar amount of
each contract to minority-owned businesses. 68  The rationale of
Croson was critical to Justice Brennan's argument for adopting inter-
mediate scrutiny in Metro Broadcasting and his ability to convince
Justice White to go along. In her Croson opinion, which Justice
White joined in full, Justice O'Connor asserted that strict scrutiny
was the appropriate standard to apply in that case. 69 She distin-
guished the City of Richmond Plan from the Public Works Act in
Fullilove on the grounds that the Fullilove program was established by
Congress.7" Thus, Justice O'Connor was able to dismiss the Fullilove
court's failure to adopt strict scrutiny,7 in her standard of review dis-
cussion Croson. 2
In Metro Broadcasting, Justice Brennan reversed Justice
O'Connor's Croson rationale in order to convince Justice White to
adopt intermediate scrutiny. Brennan first distinguished Croson by
stating that it concerned a minority set-aside program adopted by a
municipality whereas Metro Broadcasting arose from federal poli-
cies. 73 He asserted that Croson did not prescribe the level of scrutiny
to be applied to an affirmative action program employed by Congress
because the question of congressional action was not before the
Croson Court.74 Instead, Justice Brennan concluded that "Croson
reaffirmed the lesson of Fullilove that race-conscious classifications
adopted by Congress to address racial and ethnic discrimination are
subject to a different standard than such classifications prescribed by
67. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
68. Id. at 477-78.
69. Id. at 494.
70. Id. at 487-91.
71. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
72. Croson, 488 U.S. at 486-93.
73. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3009.
74. Id. This distinction between congressional action and state or municipal action appears
to have been crucial to Justice White's decision to apply intermediate scrutiny. See Scanlan,
supra note 28, at S-14 (analyzing Justice White's position in Metro Broadcasting and stating
that "the distinction between congressionally mandated and state and locally imposed race-
conscious measures [drawn in Croson] ... later formed the linchpin of Metro.").
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state and local governments." ' Finally, Justice Brennan concluded
that because neither Croson nor Fullilove dictated the standard of
review to be adopted in Metro Broadcasting,76 the Court was free to
employ intermediate scrutiny in reviewing the FCC policies.
The manner in which Justice Brennan structured his argument in
favor of intermediate scrutiny enabled Justice White to join the
majority without appearing to be overtly inconsistent with his posi-
tions in Fullilove and Croson. Justices Brennan, Blackmun and Mar-
shall each had endorsed intermediate scrutiny since the inception of
its application to government affirmative action in Bakke. However,
for Justice White Metro Broadcasting was the first government affirm-
ative action case in which he employed the standard.
III. JUSTICE WHITE'S INCONSISTENCY IN ADOPTING
INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY IN METRO BROADCASTING
A. The Concept of Consistent Application
According to Justice O'Connor, the standard of review that the
Court applies to a race-conscious governmental action is of vital
importance.77 Her concerns lie not only with implementing the cor-
rect standard,7 s but also with consistently applying the same standard
to like cases.79 As she stated in Wygant,
the analysis and level of scrutiny applied to determine the validity
of [a racial] classification do not vary because the objective appears
acceptable to individual Members of the Court. While the validity
and importance of the objective may affect the outcome of the anal-
ysis, the analysis itself does not change.8"
The following discussion of Justice White's decision to apply interme-
diate scrutiny in Metro Broadcasting is premised on Justice
O'Connor's view that members of the Court should remain consistent
in their application of a particular standard of review.
B. Analysis of Justice White's Past Government
Affirmative Action Record
As demonstrated above Justice Brennan was able to clear the
75. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3009 (emphasis added).
76. Croson never addressed congressional action and Fullilove did not formally adopt any
specific standard of review.
77. See supra p. 1306.
78. See supra note 24.
79. Cf NATHANNE W. GREENE, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE
160 n.21 (1989).
80. 476 U.S. at 285-86 (quoting Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718,
724 n.9 (1982)).
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way for Justice White's adoption of intermediate scrutiny in Metro
Broadcasting. He made that adoption appear consistent with Justice
White's positions in Bakke, Fullilove, and Croson, resulting in an
unexpected victory for Brennan.8 ' Notwithstanding Justice Bren-
nan's ability to make it appear otherwise, Justice White's decision to
side with the liberals in applying a relaxed level of scrutiny is far from
harmonious with his past record. A number of glaring inconsistencies
exist between his affirmative action record and the use of a relaxed
standard of review in Metro Broadcasting. Justice White's decision to
adopt intermediate scrutiny appears flawed when held up to Justice
O'Connor's concept of consistent application.
1. BAKKE
In Bakke, Justice White did join Justice Brennan's opinion
endorsing the application of intermediate scrutiny to the review of
government affirmative action measures.82 However, of the four
members of the Brennan group, White was the only one who also
joined Part III-A of Justice Powell's opinion. 3 In that section of his
analysis, Justice Powell endorsed the use of strict scrutiny for race
conscious measures adopted by government.
84
Justice White's decision to join Part II-A of Powell's opinion
created two major inconsistencies; one within the framework of the
Bakke decision itself, the second with White's acceptance of interme-
diate scrutiny in Metro Broadcasting. The first inconsistency stems
from White's simultaneous acceptance of intermediate scrutiny in
Justice Brennan's opinion and of strict scrutiny in Justice Powell's
opinion.85 The two standards are unquestionably at odds with each
other, and the adoption of both in the same decision appears irrecon-
cilable. The second inconsistency is created by White's decision to
subscribe to the use of intermediate scrutiny in Metro Broadcasting.6
One of the key rationales for White's use of a relaxed standard in
Metro Broadcasting was the fact that he had joined Justice Brennan in
espousing intermediate scrutiny in Bakke. 7 The argument loses con-
siderable credibility, however, given White's less than convincing
81. The use of intermediate scrutiny decided this case early. See Devins, supra note 21, at
135. Diversity, if not a "compelling" objective under strict scrutiny, is at least an "important"
one under intermediate scrutiny. Id.
82. See supra text accompanying note 17.
83. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 387 n.7.
84. Id. at 287-91.
85. Id. at 359.
86. 110 S. Ct. at 3009.
87. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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endorsement of intermediate scrutiny in Bakke. Justice White offered
no explanation for his reasoning in Bakke ;88 neither did he attempt to
resolve the inconsistency in Metro Broadcasting.89
2. FULLILOVE
The position Justice White adopted in Metro Broadcasting is also
inconsistent with his stance in Fullilove. Justice Brennan's strong reli-
ance on Fullilove to justify intermediate scrutiny in Metro Broadcast-
ing should not have convinced Justice White to do so.
In voting to uphold the congressionally enacted affirmative
action program at issue in Fullilove, Justice Marshall, in a concurring
opinion joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun, supported the use
of intermediate scrutiny. 90 Justice White, on the other hand, dropped
out of the "Brennan group," of which he was a member in Bakke, and
instead joined the plurality opinion of Chief Justice Burger. That
opinion, while not adopting strict scrutiny,91 expressly declined to
adopt any of the tests from Bakke,92 of which intermediate scrutiny
was obviously one. Therefore, by joining the Burger opinion, Justice
White implicitly rejected the use of intermediate scrutiny for evaluat-
ing congressionally mandated affirmative action policies. Even if
FCC policies were mandated by Congress, 93 by choosing to review
them through an intermediate scrutiny analysis in Metro Broadcast-
ing, Justice White endorsed an entirely new and inconsistent position.
In order to remain consistent with his Fullilove position, while at the
same time voting to uphold the FCC policies, Justice White would
have had to write separately in Metro Broadcasting, applying a test
similar to that articulated by Chief Justice Burger in Fullilove.
88. See Herman Schwartz, The 1986 and 1987 Affirmative Action Cases: It's All Over but
the Shouting, 86 MICH. L. REV. 524, 544 n.114 (1987) (Justice White may have joined that
part of Justice Powell's opinion for reasons other than the standard of review, but he made no
such distinction in Bakke).
89. Another potential inconsistency arises from Justice White's likely reliance on Bakke to
support diversity as a legitimate goal in Metro Broadcasting. Aside from the debate about
whether diversity should ever be a legitimate goal under any standard of review, Bakke should
have no bearing at all on the specific situation at issue in Metro Broadcasting. See Fried, supra
note 19, at 113 ("analogizing the FCC to the governing body of a university, protected by the
ancient value of academic freedom, is almost derisory.").
90. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 519 (Marshall, J., concurring).
91. See supra notes 65, 66 and accompanying text.
92. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 491-92 (Burger, C.J., plurality opinion) ("This opinion does not
adopt, either expressly or implicitly, the formulas of analysis articulated in such cases as
University of California Regents v. Bakke.").
93. For a discussion of whether this particular program was congressionally mandated, see
Devins, supra note 21. For a general criticism of the use of appropriations riders as a means of
determining the desires of Congress, see Neal E. Devins, Regulation of Government Agencies
Through Limitation Riders, 1987 DUKE L.J. 456, 458 n.16 (1987).
1992] 1317
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:1305
Instead, he joined the majority, and in turn adopted a position which
he had previously repudiated.
Fullilove is an improper basis for Justice White's decision to
apply intermediate scrutiny in Metro Broadcasting for yet another rea-
son. According to Justice O'Connor, Fullilove concerned the exercise
of congressional powers under section five of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.94 O'Connor stated that "the opinions make clear that it was
section five that led the Court to apply a different form of review to
the challenged program."9 5 In defending the application of a relaxed
standard of review, Justice Brennan disputed O'Connor's assertion,
claiming it was simply incorrect. 96 Instead, Brennan noted that Chief
Justice Burger's Fullilove opinion expressly provided that in enacting
the Public Works Act, "Congress employed an amalgam of its specifi-
cally delegated powers."97 Although scholars recognized that Fulli-
love technically mentioned some of these powers, namely Congress'
Spending and Commerce Power,9s most believed that Fullilove pri-
marily rested on section five of the 14th Amendment.99
C. Croson
Justice White's decision to apply intermediate scrutiny in Metro
Broadcasting is inconsistent, regardless of whether Justice O'Connor
is correct in her reading of Fullilove. As Justice O'Connor pointed
out in Metro Broadcasting, even if it was questionable whether Fulli-
love was actually based on an exercise of section five powers by Con-
gress, "Croson resolved any doubt that might remain regarding this
point.''  In her Croson opinion, Justice O'Connor expressly stated
that in Fullilove "Congress was exercising its powers under section
94. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3030 (stating that the Congress shall have "power to
enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article," including the Equal
Protection Clause, citing U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 3008 n. 11.
97. Id. (quoting Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 473.).
98. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 475.
99. See, e.g., Michel Rosenfeld, Decoding Richmond- Affirmative Action and the Elusive
Meaning of Constitutional Equality, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1729, 1731 n.14 (stating that the
program in Fullilove was "mandated by Congress, which was acting, inter alia, pursuant to its
special powers under § 5 of the fourteenth amendment.").
100. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3031. See also Jennifer M. Bott, Note, From Bakke
to Croson: The Affirmative Action Quagmire and the D. C. Circuit's Approach to FCC Minority
Preference Policies, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 845, 852 (analyzing the distinction between
Croson and Fullilove by focusing on Congress' constitutional mandate to enforce the 14th
Amendment); see also Stoelting, supra note 42, at 1105 (concluding that Chief Justice Burger's
majority opinion in Fullilove "placed considerable significance on the fact that Congress
enacted [the program] pursuant to its powers under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment").
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five of the Fourteenth Amendment... ."10 The lack of ambiguity in
this language should have solidified the constitutional basis of Fulli-
love, at least for the Justices who joined Justice O'Connor's opinion.
Nevertheless, in Metro Broadcasting, Justice Brennan disputed
Justice O'Connor's reading of Fullilove.10 2 Brennan, of course, did
not contradict himself, because he did not join any part of Justice
O'Connor's Croson opinion. In contrast, Justice White, who joined
Justice O'Connor's opinion in full, is not privy to the same defense.
Rather, by abdicating strict scrutiny in Metro Broadcasting, Justice
White directly contradicted his position in Croson. In Croson, he had
espoused a specific rationale to distinguish Fullilove; in Metro Broad-
casting he renounced it without comment. Justice White's application
of intermediate scrutiny to the FCC policies, which the majority does
not claim were enacted under Congress' section five powers, is judi-
cially inconsistent with his previous position on the proper standard
of review to be applied to governmental affirmative action programs.
IV. THE ACTUAL EFFECT OF THE STANDARD OF REVIEW IN
JUSTICE WHITE'S AFFIRMATIVE ACTION ADJUDICATION
When analyzed in accordance with Justice O'Connor's concept
of rigid adherence to a particular level of scrutiny,103 Justice White's
decision to employ intermediate scrutiny in Metro Broadcasting
appears questionable in light of his previous affirmative action posi-
tions. However, Justice White's decision to join the majority in
upholding the FCC policies is not incompatible with his past affirma-
tive action record. Instead, there appears to be a methodological dif-
ference in Justice White's approach to affirmative action adjudication.
As previously noted, Justice O'Connor postulates that "[w]hile
the validity and importance of the objective may affect the outcome of
the analysis, the analysis itself does not change.'  In contrast, Jus-
tice White's method of constitutional adjudication appears to be
opposite of Justice O'Connor's. For White, the validity and impor-
tance of the objective are not merely factors in the analysis. Instead,
they seem to affirmatively determine the level of scrutiny he will
apply. As a result, the standard of review becomes a procedural
means for achieving what Justice White considers to be a legitimate
101. City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 504 (1989) (opinion of O'Connor, J., joined
by Rehnquist, C.J., and White, J.).
102. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 4, 5 and accompanying text.
104. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
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end. 105
Justice White's decision to uphold the FCC policies in Metro
Broadcasting, as well as his other recent decisions in the government
affirmative action area, seem to hinge on two relevant factors: The
first concerns the level of government implementing the race-based
policies; the second involves the goals to be accomplished through
these policies. Both facts appear to be equally relevant to Justice
White's adjudication, and both are therefore crucial to a prediction of
the possible outcome of future affirmative action cases before the
Supreme Court.
A. Congressional Action
As discussed, Justice White places a premium on judicial defer-
ence to congressional action.10 6 This deference unquestionably played
a significant role in the outcome of Metro Broadcasting."7 Justice
Brennan's opinion stressed that Congress, and not state or local gov-
ernment, had mandated the policies before the Court. 0 Whether
Congress actually mandated the FCC policies is subject to debate. °9
105. The key to understanding this reasoning lies in the realities of constitutional
adjudication and the actual effect of each standard of review. Rarely will the Court uphold a
government race-conscious measure under strict scrutiny. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at
543 (under strict scrutiny "almost nothing goes."). From a pragmatic standpoint, strict
scrutiny is often "strict in theory, but fatal in fact." Id. (quoting Gerald Gunther, Foreword:
In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court.: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86
HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972)). Intermediate scrutiny, therefore, becomes a means for upholding
programs which would otherwise fail under the stricter counterpart.
106. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. One possible explanation for Justice
White's respect for congressional legislation in this area is the overwhelming factual record
which usually accompanies a congressional decision to enact race-conscious legislation. In
Fullilove, Chief Justice Burger stated that "Congress had abundant evidence from which it
could conclude that minority businesses have been denied effective participation in public
contracting opportunities by procurement practices that perpetuated the effects of prior
discrimination." 448 U.S. at 477-78. Likewise, in Metro Broadcasting, Congress had made
significant factual findings "that the effects of past inequities stemming from racial and ethnic
discrimination have resulted in a severe underrepresentation of minorities in the media of mass
communications." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 765, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 43 (1982), reprinted in
1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2261, 2287. Additionally, the likelihood of abuse by special interests has
historically been much less of a concern at the federal level than at the local level. See
generally THE FEDERAUST No. 10 (J. Madison). The fact that the Richmond City Council in
Croson had a black majority of five to four may have invigorated the Court's continued
skepticism of local affirmative action programs.
107. Jesse Choper, Dean of Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California at Berkeley
attributes Justice White's decision to join the Brennan majority to White's preference to defer
to Congress' Fourteenth Amendment power to eliminate the effects of discrimination. See
Reuben, supra note 38.
108. See supra notes 58 & 61 and accompanying text.
109. See Devins, supra note 21, at 137-41 (questioning whether limitation riders are
appropriate sources for determining the dictates of Congress). For a general criticism of
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Regardless, Justice White's comments at oral argument show that he
realized the extent to which Congress actually approved of this pro-
gram. 1° Even given that realization, Justice White was still willing to
defer to what he perceived to be the dictates of Congress in this
area. I I
Because the Court, and particularly Justice White as the swing
vote, emphasized that Metro Broadcasting dealt at least indirectly
with congressional action, some scholars have concluded that "when
it comes to an act of Congress, the analysis is intermediate scru-
tiny." 1'2 As a result, others predict that "by allowing the federal gov-
ernment to 'experiment with affirmative action in ways the states
can't,' the Court had raised the prospect that civil rights groups will
lobby Congress to authorize or order states to enact" additional race-
based programs.113
The prediction that the Court will automatically apply interme-
diate scrutiny to any future affirmative action policy enacted by Con-
gress-and thereby almost assuredly uphold it' 4-is far too broad a
reading of the result in Metro Broadcasting. Even for Justice White's
personal adjudication,1' 5 the mere fact that Congress has endorsed a
particular program is not enough to elicit his blanket imprimatur. As
one commentator wrote:
limitation riders as a valid means for ascertaining the desires of Congress, see Devins, supra
note 94.
110. In response to the assertion made by counsel for the FCC that Congress had acted
here, Justice White stated: "[B]ut all Congress said ... [is] that it didn't want you to change
your.., preference policy." Transcript of Oral Arguments at 39, Metro Broadcasting v. FCC,
110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990) (No. 89-453).
111. A possible explanation for this willingness lies in the other evidence of Congress'
findings quoted by Justice Brennan in Metro Broadcasting.
112. Reuben, supra note 38. This is the conclusion drawn, for example, by Erwin
Chemerinsky, a constitutional scholar at the University of Southern California Law Center in
Los Angeles.
113. Linda Campbell, State Fears More Issues Becoming a Federal Case, CHI. TRIB., July
15, 1990, at 5 (quoting Professor David Strauss, of the University of Chicago). Senator Paul
Simon (D-Ill.) has introduced a bill that would authorize state and local governments to have
set-asides for minorities. Engineering News-Record, Aug. 16, 1990, at 7. Scholars have drawn
other related conclusions in the wake of the Metro Broadcasting decision. For instance,
Professor Kathleen Sullivan of Harvard Law School stated that "the Supreme Court had
shown itself to be so deferential to Congress on affirmative action that it might uphold a
Federal law, if one were enacted, overturning last year's ruling striking down the Richmond
affirmative action plan." Neil Lewis, Court Ruling Encourages Affirmative Action, N.Y.
TIMES, July 4, 1990, at 12. Representative John Conyers, Jr., D-Mich, chairman of the House
Government Operations Committee, has already held hearings on a bill to overturn the
Richmond ruling by act of Congress. Id. See also Campbell, supra, at 5.
114. See supra note 106.
115. The analysis of Justice White's position is important given his vote to uphold any
government program which takes race into account.
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To the extent that [Justice White's] vote can be essentially recon-
ciled with his other post-Fullilove positions-and does not reflect a
material modification of his views-the Metro decision need not
signify a much more accommodating environment for governmen-
tally imposed race-conscious action than we have observed in the
recent past. And there is reason to believe that the continued diffi-
culty of sustaining such measures may be almost as great for con-
gressionally imposed measures as for those imposed at the state
and local levels.
116
The pessimism the above passage conveys about the continued expan-
sion of affirmative action by Congress can be linked to the second of
Justice White's factors, namely the goals to be achieved by govern-
ment race-based policies.
B. Diversity Understood as Benefiting Society
The supposition that Justice White will routinely uphold any
affirmative action programs created by Congress through the use of
intermediate scrutiny has no foundation in his affirmative action rec-
ord. A more appropriate assumption is that Justice White will give
Congress significant latitude to enact affirmative action legislation "as
long as it's tied to some kind of diversity that is understood as benefiting
society. "11 7 The Court appears to require more than a simple showing
of congressional assent before it relaxes its level of scrutiny. 1 In
addition to the usual legislative reasons for enacting race-conscious
measures, 119 the Court also requires that the legislation be designed to
achieve some type of diversity which benefits society.
Metro Broadcasting may have been unique in its ability to meet
this additional requirement, especially Justice White. Justice Bren-
nan's majority opinion stressed that "the diversity of views and infor-
mation on the airwaves serves important First Amendment
values."1 2 ° Justice Brennan thus diverted the Court's focus from the
benefit accruing to the minority applicant to the "benefits [which]
redound to all members of the viewing and listening audience." '21 He
justified that redirection of attention using Congress' own statement
that "the American public will benefit by having access to a wider
diversity of information sources." '12 2 Ultimately, that shift in focus
116. Scanlan, supra note 28, at S-14.
117. Lewis, supra note 64 (quoting Professor Kathleen Sullivan) (emphasis added).
118. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
119. See infra notes 123 & 127.
120. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3010.
121. Id. at 3011.
122. Id. (quoting H.R. CONF. REP. No. 765, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 45 (1982), reprinted in
1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2261, 2289).
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may have led to Justice White's decision to uphold the FCC policies.
Justice White's majority opinion in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC 123 provides evidence of his support of the position that a diverse
media is a significant benefit to society as a whole. In Red Lion
Broadcasting, Justice White expressly stated that "it is the right of the
viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is para-
mount."' 124 Moreover, "[i]t is the right of the public to receive suita-
ble access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and
experiences which is crucial .. ,,.125 Justice White may have felt that
he was adhering to this position once again in Metro Broadcasting.
His view that the public has a right to broadcast diversity probably
facilitated the decision to uphold the FCC policies, especially in light
of Congress' findings that preference policies "promot[e] the primary
communications policy objective of achieving a greater diversification
of the media of mass communications."
' 126
Another recent decision of the Supreme Court furnishes support
for the conclusion that congressional action alone is not enough to
prompt the Court to automatically apply intermediate scrutiny and
uphold the race-based program. Just one year before Metro Broad-
casting, the Court refused to uphold the congressional affirmative
action program at issue in HK. Porter Co. v. Metropolitan Dade
County. 127 In H.K. Porter, the Eleventh Circuit had upheld a congres-
sionally funded affirmative action program that set percentage goals
for minority business participation following congressional specifica-
tions. 128 Although Congress had acted more directly than in Metro
Broadcasting, the Supreme Court, with Justice White joining the
majority, vacated the judgment and remanded the case for further
consideration in light of City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co. 129 The
result in H.K. Porter seems to indicate that strict scrutiny will be
applied to congressional affirmative action plans which do not benefit
society through the promotion of diversity.'
123. 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (upholding the right of the FCC to regulate radio frequencies).
124. Id. at 390.
125. Id.
126. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 765, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 45 (1982), reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2261, 2288.
127. 489 U.S. 1062 (1989) (memorandum opinion).
128. 825 F.2d 324, 325-26 (1 th Cir. 1987) (per curiam).
129. H.K Porter, 489 U.S. at 1062.
130. The Eleventh Circuit had upheld the program at issue in H.K Porter by using Fullilove
as the basis of its analysis. H.K. Porter, 825 F.2d at 328-32. While the case can be
distinguished from Fullilove in that Congress left the exact percentages to be awarded to
minorities up to the local agency in H.K. Porter, the case still provides substantial proof that
the Court will not routinely uphold congressional affirmative action programs which does not
have attendant societal benefits accomplished through diversity.
1992]
1324 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:1305
V. CONCLUSION
In all likelihood, the use of intermediate scrutiny in Metro Broad-
casting provided Justice White with a suitable way to uphold a con-
gressional program which he believed furthered a legitimate diversity
interest to the benefit of society. Due to the unique factual setting of
Metro Broadcasting, and in light of Justice White's views expressed in
Red Lion Broadcasting, one should hesitate to read the result in Metro
Broadcasting as opening the floodgates to additional affirmative action
programs by Congress. Unless Congress is trying to foster a type of
diversity the Court deems beneficial to society as a whole, the Court is
unlikely to apply a relaxed standard of scrutiny in reviewing the par-
ticular race-based measure.
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